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 ostile cyber operations have grown increasingly consequential. The 2007 
watershed operations against Estonia1 that first turned the international 
community’s attention to the role of international law in cyberspace were 
soon surpassed with respect to severity of effects and potential for disruption 
of international peace and security by subsequent events in cyberspace. Ex-
amples include the 2008 use of cyber capabilities during the international 
armed conflict between Russia and Georgia,2 the 2010 U.S./Israeli Stuxnet 
attacks on the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz,3 Iran’s 2012 
Saudi Aramco cyber attacks,4 Russia’s 2017 NotPetya operations against 
Ukraine that spread globally,5 the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attacks by 
North Korea that, among other things, disrupted medical care in the United 
Kingdom,6 and recent operations against medical facilities and research in-
stitutions combating the COVID-19 global pandemic.7 Even classic cyber 
espionage took a quantum leap during Russia’s 2021 SolarWinds operations.8 
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As illustrated by the 2018 U.S. cyber strategy, which calls for “defending 
forward” and “persistently engaging” adversaries, States are resultantly in-
creasingly focused on the measures—cyber or otherwise—to which they can 
turn in response to such cyber operations.9 Yet, responses to hostile cyber 
operations are not driven solely by strategic, operational, and technical con-
siderations. International law plays a central role, for its primary objective is 
to maintain peace and security through a rules-based system.  
The stakes are high. Although States have long grappled with questions 
of how to respond to hostile activities in the analog context, the cyber do-
main has accentuated the challenge in at least three ways: sources of hostile 
operations cannot always be identified, the speed at which such operations 
can be conducted has narrowed the time frame within which decisions as to 
whether and how to respond must be taken, and the interconnectedness of 
digital infrastructure is such that the adverse consequences of a hostile cyber 
operation can be widespread and catastrophic.  
Most cyber operations are likely to be responded to with acts of “retor-
sion,” that is, acts that are lawful, although unfriendly.10 For instance, the 
Obama administration responded to the hostile Russian cyber-meddling in 
the 2016 presidential elections by expelling diplomats and levying economic 
sanctions.11 And in 2020, the Council of the European Union employed its 
“cyber diplomacy toolbox” for the first time to impose a travel ban and asset 
freeze on six individuals and three entities that were involved in the Organ-
isation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, WannaCry, NotPetya, and 
the Cloud Hopper operations.12  
 
9. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2018). See 
also generally CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, REPORT 23–122 (2020), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL_dZ30QyjFqFkkf10MxIXJGT4yv/view. 
10. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [here-
inafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
11. David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hack-
ing-sanctions.html. 
12. Council of the European Union, Press Release, EU Imposes the First Ever Sanc-
tions against Cyber-Attacks (July 30, 2020), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
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tacks/; Erica Moret & Patryk Pawlak, The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: Towards a Cyber Sanc-












However, the effectiveness of retorsion against offending States and 
hostile non-State actors is limited. Accordingly, international law also recog-
nizes other self-help mechanisms that allow for more robust responses than 
would otherwise be unlawful. They are captured in the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which serves as a generally 
reliable restatement of that customary body of law.13  
Comprising “secondary rules” of international law,14 the articles elabo-
rate circumstances in which a State breaches an international obligation and 
thereby commits an “internationally wrongful act.”15 They also set out vari-
ous “circumstances precluding wrongfulness” in which a State will not be 
held internationally responsible for an action or omission that would other-
wise be an internationally wrongful act. There are six such circumstances: 
consent, self-defense, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, and neces-
sity.16  
In the cyber context, most attention has focused on countermeasures 
and self-defense. Yet, both are subject to various limitations that constrain 
their availability to States that have been on the receiving end of hostile cyber 
operations. For example, countermeasures are only available in response to 
cyber operations attributable to a State,17 while interpretive ambiguity con-
cerning where the armed attack threshold lies plagues the law of self-defense 
 
13. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10. 
14. Primary rules impose obligations and set forth prohibitions. Secondary rules deal 
with the framework within which those rules operate, such as the requirements for attribu-
tion, grounds for the preclusion of wrongfulness of an act (like necessity), and conse-
quences, such as reparations. The conceptual distinction between primary and secondary 
rules may have been one key to the success of the International Law Commission’s project 
in respect of the general rules on State responsibility, but insofar as the circumstances pre-
cluding wrongfulness, that distinction is more difficult to sustain. After all, countermeasures 
and self-defense function as secondary rules that preclude wrongfulness, but they also con-
stitute primary rules in the sense that a State has a “right” under international law to conduct 
countermeasures or engage in self-defense. The circumstance of necessity, on the other 
hand, is more ambiguous. While under classical international law it was recognized as a right 
belonging to States and intimately linked to self-preservation, whether, under contemporary 
law, it functions only to temporarily preclude international responsibility for non-compli-
ance with an existing obligation is a matter over which legal experts divide. This article takes 
no position on the issue.        
15. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 2. 
16. Id. arts. 20–25. 











(notwithstanding State practice extending its availability in response to non-
State actors).18  
In light of such applicative restrictions, this article examines a third op-
tion. By relying on the so-called “plea of necessity,” States may be able to 
respond lawfully to a hostile cyber operation when the action taken would 
otherwise be unlawful, but is the only way to safeguard an “essential interest” 
of the State from a “grave and imminent peril.”19 Although the plea has com-
manded comparatively little commentary among legal experts or in States’ 
statements regarding their position on the applicability of international law 
to cyberspace, it avoids some of the limitations and ambiguity besetting its 
counterparts. Indeed, necessity often provides a more defensible legal basis 
for responding to serious hostile cyber operations, although it is not without 
its own limitations and ambiguity. To grasp the unique role of necessity in 
the pantheon of response options, one must first examine self-defense and 
countermeasures. 
 
II. UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITATIONS IN THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE 
 
Pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and customary inter-
national law, States have a right to resort to the use of force in the face of an 
“armed attack.”20 It follows that a hostile cyber operation that unambigu-
ously constitutes an armed attack gives rise to the right to use force lawfully 
in self-defense.21 No State has thus far relied upon that right in responding 
to a hostile cyber operation.   
The simplicity of Article 51’s text belies the ambiguity of its application 
in practice, for the threshold at which a cyber operation qualifies as an 
“armed attack” is murky. Two issues concerning the meaning of armed at-
tack loom large. The first deals with the nature of an armed attack. Although 
there is widespread acceptance of the right of self-defense’s applicability to 
physically destructive or injurious cyber operations, whether the term en-
compasses cyber operations having other consequences, and, if so, what type 
 
18. Michael N. Schmitt & Durward E. Johnson, Responding to Hostile Cyber Operations: 
The “In-Kind” Option, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 96, 104–6 (2021). 
19. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 25(1). 
20. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
21. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OP-
ERATIONS r. 71 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 











remains unsettled.22 This is problematic because cyber operations are partic-
ularly well-suited to causing severe harm and disruption without accompa-
nying physical damage or injury. The paradigmatic example is a cyber oper-
ation targeting a State’s financial system with devastating consequences. To 
date, only France has openly taken the position that non-destructive or inju-
rious cyber operations can open the door to a forceful response by the victim 
State, although some other States will likely follow suit in the not-too-distant 
future.23  
A second issue deals with the requisite intensity of a cyber operation at 
the level of an armed attack. In its Nicaragua judgment, the International 
Court of Justice set forth the most widely accepted position on the matter, 
opining that only the “most grave” uses of force qualify as an armed attack 
against which the victim State may respond forcibly.24 This is an ambiguous 
 
22. For instance, the Chairman’s Summary on the Third Substantive Session of the 
U.N. Open-Ended Working Group noted:  
 
While recalling that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations 
applies in the use of ICTs [information and communications technology], it was highlighted 
that certain questions on how international law applies to the use of ICTs have yet to be 
fully clarified. Some States proposed that such questions include, inter alia, the kind of ICT-
related activity that might be interpreted by other States as a threat or use of force (Art. 2(4) 
of the Charter) or that might give a State cause to invoke its inherent right to self-defence 
(Art. 51 of the Charter). 
 
Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecom-
munications in the Context of International Security, Chair’s Summary, Third Substantive 
Session, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.3 (Mar. 10, 2021), https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Chairs-Summary-A-AC.290-2021-CRP.3.pdf. 
23. MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES [MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES], INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLIED TO OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE § 1.2.1 (2019) (Fr.), https://www.de-
fense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+ 
operations+in+cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO 
CYBERSPACE]. 
24. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 181 (June 27). The United States, by contrast, takes the position that all uses of 
force are equally armed attacks. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.3.3.1 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DoD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL], citing Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 
International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM 
Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), 54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUR-











threshold that is difficult to apply in practice except in the most extreme 
cases, not least in the cyber domain.25  
Beyond the normative content of the term armed attack, an additional 
unsettled matter involves the identity of the actor launching the operation. 
Until the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the prevailing view was that the law of 
self-defense only applies when State organs conduct an armed attack or non-
State actors do so operating “by or on behalf of a State” or with the “sub-
stantial involvement” of one.26 The scale and severity of the 9/11 attacks, 
which a non-State actor—al Qaeda—mounted without any State’s meaning-
ful involvement, challenged this traditional paradigm.27 In the immediate af-
termath of the attacks, the United Nations Security Council, international 
organizations like NATO, and individual States treated self-defense as ex-
tending to attacks by non-State actors that reach the requisite level of harm. 
On that basis, the United States and its partners conducted operations in 
Afghanistan and mounted counter-ISIS operations.28 Yet, in its 2004 Wall 
advisory opinion and 2005 Armed Activities judgment, the International Court 
of Justice displayed discomfort with applying the right of self-defense to 
non-State attacks lacking a clear connection to a State.29   
The fact that non-State actors operating alone mount many hostile cyber 
operations against and into States begs the question of whether self-defense 
is available as the basis for a response at all in such circumstances, even if 
the operations otherwise qualify as armed attacks. It is also common for 
States to outsource hostile cyber operations to non-State actors, which can 
be done in a manner (in many cases intentionally so) that makes it difficult 
 
25. The International Court struggled with the issue in the Oil Platforms case, where in 
dicta it was unable to come to a definitive conclusion as to whether the mining of a single 
warship would rise to the level of an armed attack. Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), 2003 I.C.J. 
161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6). In the cyber context, see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, at 340–
44. 
26. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195. 
27. Terry D. Gill & Kinga Tibori-Szabó, Twelve Key Questions on Self-Defense against Non-
State Actors, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 467, 475–90 (2019). 
28. See discussion in Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies and International Law, 24 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 536–39 (2003). 
29. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Ter-
ritory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146–











to determine whether Nicaragua’s “by or on behalf” standard has been satis-
fied.30 Moreover, hostile cyber operations can prove challenging to attribute 
factually to a State because an attacker might intentionally mask the attack’s 
origin by, for instance, conducting a false flag operation.31   
Even assuming the right of self-defense extends to non-State actor at-
tacks, uncertainty surrounds the issue of where defensive operations may be 
conducted. The United States and certain other States have adopted the po-
sition that the right of self-defense permits operations against non-State ac-
tors pursuant to the so-called “unwilling or unable test” when they are lo-
cated in other States that are not responsible in law for their operations.32 
This has raised apprehension in the international community regarding the 
legal basis for crossing into another State’s territory to conduct the opera-
tion, for to do so would be a clear violation of its sovereignty absent a “cir-
cumstance precluding wrongfulness,” like self-defense.33  
This controversy is even more problematic in the cyber context. Most 
hostile operations are conducted remotely from other States. If those oper-
ations are severe enough to qualify as an armed attack and are mounted by a 
State or a non-State actor from the territory of a State that does not bear 
responsibility for them, the unwilling or unable debate applies mutatis mutan-
dis. It is rendered incredibly complex because in the non-cyber context the 
response likely would violate, at least, the legal obligation to respect the ter-
ritorial inviolability (sovereignty) of the State into which they are conducted, 
thereby necessitating a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.  
To further complicate matters, the United Kingdom has questioned the 
very existence of an international law rule of sovereignty.34 Although this is 
 
30. See generally Durward E. Johnson & Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Proxy Cyber 
Operations under International Law, 6 CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW (forthcoming 2021). 
31. Josh Fruhlinger, What is a False Flag? How State-Based Hackers Cover Their Tracks, CSO 
UNITED KINGDOM (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3512027/what-is-
a-false-flag-how-state-based-hackers-cover-their-tracks.html. 
32. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2012); 
Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 91 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 1 (2015). 
33. See, e.g., FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, § 
1.2.3. 
34. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, United Kingdom, Cyber and International Law 
in the 21st Century, Remarks at the Chatham House Royal Institute for International Affairs 












not a view shared by any other State, even among States that accept sover-
eignty as a rule, there is no consensus on what effects amount to a violation 
of the State’s sovereignty.35 Therefore, in a given situation, the question of 
whether a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is needed at all to justify a 
cyber response into the non-responsible State may present itself.  
 
III. UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITATIONS IN THE LAW OF                      
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
The other response option that States typically consider in the face of hostile 
cyber operations is the taking of countermeasures.36 Simply put, counter-
measures are tools that seek to ensure law compliance. As the commentary 
to the Articles on State Responsibility explains, they are “a feature of a de-
centralized system by which injured States may seek to vindicate their rights 
and to restore the legal relationship with the responsible State which has 
been ruptured by the internationally wrongful act.”37 The option of taking 
countermeasures is desirable as a response to hostile cyber operations be-
cause it opens the door to “hack backs” and other remedial cyber measures 
into another State’s territory. 
 
35. Switzerland highlighted the uncertainty in its 2021 statement on international law’s 
applicability to cyber operations. Switzerland recognizes that defining what constitutes a 
violation of the principle of sovereignty in cyberspace is particularly challenging and has yet 
to be clarified conclusively. It supports considering the following two criteria in such assess-
ments: first, does the incident violate the State’s territorial integrity and second, does it con-
stitute interference with or usurpation of an inherently governmental function. A precise 
definition of these criteria is a question of interpretation and subject to debate. The current 
debate includes among other aspects: (i) incidents whereby the functionality of infrastruc-
ture or related equipment has been damaged or limited; (ii) cases where data has been altered 
or deleted, interfering with the fulfilment of inherently governmental functions such as 
providing social services, conducting elections and referendums, or collecting taxes: and (iii) 
situations in which a State has sought to influence, disrupt or delay democratic decision-
making processes in another State through the coordinated use of legal and illegal methods 
in cyberspace, e.g., propaganda, disinformation and covert actions by intelligence services. 
The assessment of an individual case depends on the nature of the cyber incident and its 
repercussions. Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Interna-
tional Law, Switzerland’s Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyber-
space 3 (Annex UN GGE 2019/2021), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/docu-
ments/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20210527-Schweiz-Annex-UN-GGE-Cybersecurity-20 
19-2021_EN.pdf. 
36. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, arts. 22, 49–53. 











However, as countermeasures involve what would generally be unlawful 
activity, international law imposes stringent limitations. First, the condition 
precedent to the taking of a countermeasure is an internationally wrongful 
act.38 To qualify as such an act, the action or omission must be attributable 
to a State under the law of State responsibility.39 In certain limited circum-
stances, the due diligence rule may open the door to countermeasures taking 
the form of action against non-State actors whose hostile cyber operations 
are not attributable to a State on the basis that the territorial State has 
breached its obligation of due diligence.40 That rule provides that States are 
required “to take all measures that are feasible in the circumstances to put 
an end to cyber operations that affect the right of, and produce serious ad-
verse consequences for, other States.”41 Yet, it must be cautioned that the 
very existence of a due diligence rule, especially in the cyber context, is con-
troversial.42  
Second, countermeasures must be proportionate in the sense of a rough 
equivalency between the harm caused by the underlying unlawful act and the 
 
38. Id. art. 22. 
39. Id. art. 2(a). 
40. Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
FORUM 68, 79–80 (2015).  
41. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, r. 7; see also id. r. 6. 
42. For instance, Israel has rejected application of the rule of due diligence to cyber 
activities on the basis that “we have not seen widespread State practice beyond this type of 
voluntary cooperation, and certainly not practice grounded in some overarching opinio juris, 
which would be indispensable for a customary rule of due diligence, or something similar 
to that, to form.” Roy Schöndorf, Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning 
the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 395, 
404 (2021). Most other States that have taken a firm position on the issue take the opposite 
view. Germany, as an example, citing the International Court of Justice’s first case, Corfu 
Channel, asserts that “States are under an ‘obligation not to allow knowingly their territory 
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’ ” It interprets this rule as applying 
to cyber operations by both States and non-State actors mounted from the territorial State. 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBER-
SPACE 3 (Mar. 2021) (Ger.), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2446304/32e7b2498e 
10b74fb17204c54665bdf0/on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-data.pdf 
[hereinafter GERMANY, ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE]. 
It must be cautioned that this public international law rule is distinct from the obligation of 
due diligence in international human rights law. Human Rights Committee, General Com-











countermeasure.43 Unlike self-defense, the severity of a countermeasure is 
not assessed against the response required to end the internationally wrong-
ful act to which it responds. Thus, there could be a situation in which a State 
is capable of taking action to end a hostile cyber operation but is precluded 
from doing so because the consequences of its response would be excessive 
relative to the harm that State is suffering.  
Third, while the law of self-defense permits collective defense, it is un-
clear whether collective countermeasures, in the sense of acting on behalf of 
a State entitled to take countermeasures or assisting that State to take its own 
countermeasures, are permissible. In an ongoing debate, Estonia has taken 
the position that coming to another State’s assistance in this regard is lawful, 
whereas France has opined that it is not.44 Should the French view prevail, 
the cyber countermeasure option will be taken off the table for many States, 
as they lack the cyber capacity to conduct them, at least without significant 
assistance.  
 
IV. NECESSITY AS A RESPONSE OPTION 
 
International law is not a seamless tapestry. In some situations, neither self-
defense nor countermeasures provide a clear basis upon which States seeking 
to respond lawfully to a hostile cyber operation may act. Self-defense has 
four weaknesses that might cause States to be unable to look to it as a cir-
cumstance precluding wrongfulness, or at least be hesitant to do so: uncer-
tainty as to the nature of the harm that qualifies a cyber operation as an 
armed attack; ambiguity as to the hostile operation’s requisite severity; con-
troversy over whether self-defense applies to cyber armed attacks launched 
by non-State actors (and the related challenges of factual and legal attribu-
tion); and the question of whether responses based on self-defense may be 
conducted into States to which the hostile cyber operations are not attribut-
able. Countermeasures are unavailable against cyber operations that do not 
violate international law or those of non-State actors whose cyber operations 
 
43. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 51 (“Countermeasures must be 
commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally 
wrongful act and the rights in question.”). 
44. FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, § 1.1.3; 
Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia, Opening Address at CyCon 2019 (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at 
-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html. For an assessment of the dueling positions, see 
Sean Watts & Michael N. Schmitt, Collective Cyber Countermeasures?, 12 HARVARD NATIONAL 











cannot be attributed to a State. They are also unavailable when the counter-
measure’s consequences are disproportionate to the harm caused by the hos-
tile operation to which it responds. Additionally, it is unclear whether States 
may look to other States to conduct countermeasures on their behalf or to 
provide the assistance that is necessary for the victim State to take them. In 
exceptional circumstances, the plea of necessity can address some of the legal 
obstacles and ambiguities inherent in both self-defense and countermeas-
ures. 
Necessity is a core principle of international law that operates in diverse 
ways within different legal regimes. For example, it is a condition (the law 
governing the use of force45), a foundational principle (international human-
itarian law46), a limitation (international human right law47), and a legal de-
fense (international criminal law48). The focus here is on its place in the law 
of State responsibility. 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the International Court of Justice 
expressly held that necessity “is a ground recognized by customary interna-
tional law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with 
an international obligation.”49 Article 25 of the International Law Commis-
sion’s Articles on State Responsibility restates this customary law basis for 
preclusion of wrongfulness. 
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State unless the act: 
 
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against 
a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international commu-
nity as a whole.  
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if: 
 
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or 
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.50 
 
Notwithstanding its inclusion in the Articles on State Responsibility as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness, legal experts remain divided over 
whether necessity should be understood as a general principle of interna-
tional law, a customary international law right, or only as a “plea” that func-
tions to preclude the international responsibility of States (or some combi-
nation thereof).51 In other words, the question is whether necessity justifies 
(right) or excuses (preclusion of wrongfulness) conduct. This article does not 
address these distinctions in depth but aims simply to tease out issues perti-





Subsection 1(a) of Article 25 identifies threshold requirements for a State to 
benefit from the plea: the nature of the protected interest, the gravity of the 
harm posed, and the need for immediate action, each of which must be in-
terpreted restrictively. First, the interest that the responding State seeks to 
protect must be “essential.” Although the International Law Commission’s 
commentary on Article 25 avoids defining “essential interest,” the Interna-
tional Group of Experts that prepared Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
 
50. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 25.  
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Law Applicable to Cyber Operations was of the view that the term refers to an 
interest that “is of fundamental and great importance to the State con-
cerned.”52 While this wording appears to lean towards a subjective judg-
ment—one that leaves assessment in the hands of the responding State—a 
State defending action taken based on necessity post factum would have to 
demonstrate that the interest being protected is “essential” by reference to 
an objective standard.53  
In the broadest sense, various categories can be said to constitute the 
essential interests of all States. As noted in the commentary to Article 25, 
“The extent to which a given interest is ‘essential’ depends on all the circum-
stances, and cannot be prejudged. It extends to particular interests of the 
State and its people.”54 These undoubtedly include such interests as the 
State’s overall economic well-being, national security, and the availability of 
healthcare, power, food, and clean water. Yet, in that the plea is an exception 
to rule compliance, a more focused approach must be taken when determin-
ing what other interests qualify as “essential” in a particular case. 
To illustrate, for a country that relies chiefly on maritime transport for 
the import of basic provisions such as food, medical supplies, or energy, 
unimpeded access to, and continued functionality of, key ports would likely 
qualify as an essential interest, together with the availability of critical goods 
delivered through them. By contrast, a port’s functionality might not qualify 
as an essential interest for a State that relies primarily on overland transport 
to move essential goods. Certain goods transported through the port could 
still qualify as essential (e.g., vaccine during a raging pandemic), but perhaps 
not the port as such. 
The essential interest requirement is often mischaracterized as encom-
passing “critical infrastructure.” However, as a matter of international law, 
the auto-designation by a State of particular infrastructure as “critical” does 
not satisfy the requirement.55 Instead, the essential interest determination is 
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objective and contextual in the sense of reasonableness in the circumstances. 
Of course, from a practical perspective, the designation of infrastructure as 
critical is instructive since it indicates the importance a State places upon it. 
This, in turn, signals the likelihood that the State might treat it as an essential 
interest vis-à-vis its right to respond to hostile cyber operations based on the 
plea of necessity. But the designation is not legally dispositive when looking 
to necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
It should be noted that neither self-defense nor countermeasures are 
contingent on an “essential interest” being negatively affected. Defensive use 
of force in response to an armed attack is permissible even if the interest 
harmed by the cyber attack is not an essential one; what matters is the sever-
ity of the attack, not the nature of the interest affected. Similarly, the sole 
threshold for the right to take countermeasures is an internationally wrongful 
act. Wrongfulness of a particular cyber operation may be determined by the 
affected sector, as in the breach of an international agreement to provide 
natural gas or a violation of sovereignty based on interference with an inher-
ently governmental function.56 Still, the right to take countermeasures in the 
abstract contains no requirement beyond attribution to a State and breach of 
a legal obligation owed the injured State. In this sense, the plea of necessity 
is more demanding than either self-defense or countermeasures, for neither 
is tied to an effect on a particular entity or genre of effect. However, in other 
regards, the plea is more flexible.  
The plea of necessity is not conditioned on the occurrence of an inter-
nationally wrongful act, which requires both attribution to a State and the 
breach of a legal obligation owed another State. First, it is agnostic as to the 
source of the harm. Rather than focusing on the actor (a State in the case of 
countermeasures and an unsettled issue in self-defense), necessity concen-
trates on addressing the threat itself. It allows for States to lawfully respond 
 
 
. . . in the cyber context, the affectedness of an “essential interest” may inter alia be explained 
by reference to the type of infrastructure actually or potentially targeted by a malicious cyber 
operation and an analysis of that infrastructure’s relevance for the State as a whole. For 
example, the protection of certain critical infrastructures may constitute an “essential inter-
est.” It might likewise be determined by reference to the type of harm actually or potentially 
caused as a consequence of a foreign State’s cyber operation. For example, the protection 
of its citizens against serious physical harm will be an “essential interest” of each State – 
regardless of whether a critical infrastructure is targeted or not. 
 
GERMANY, ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 
42, at 14–15. 











to a threat, including hostile cyber operations, even though the measure 
taken to end the threat will impinge upon the interests, including the legal 
rights, of another State that may not be responsible for the hostile operation. 
In fact, States affected by the measures the responding State takes need not 
have anything to do with creating or contributing to the threat the respond-
ing State confronts.  
This is a crucial distinction in the case of hostile cyber operations of un-
known origin or in which it is known that a non-State actor operated on its 
own. Similarly, in some instances, another State may be suspected of either 
launching the hostile operation or of “instructing, directing, or controlling” 
it such that the operation is attributable to the State,57 but the technical at-
tribution necessary for coming to that conclusion is lacking. And in still other 
cases, a State’s involvement may be known, but the level falls short of the 
threshold necessary for legal attribution, as when a State encourages conduct 
but does not control it. In these cases, countermeasures would be unavaila-
ble. By the approach that requires the non-State actor to be operating by or 
on behalf of a State or with its substantial involvement, self-defense would 
also be unavailable. However, none of the situations would prevent the State 
from acting in a way that violated legal obligations owed to other States, such 
as respect for the latter’s sovereignty, if the necessity conditions have been 
satisfied. 
To take an example, consider the case of a non-State actor conducting 
hostile cyber operations from one State against another in circumstances in 
which there is no basis for attributing the operations to the territorial State 
under the law of State responsibility. Assume in this scenario that the terri-
torial State can do nothing to put an end to the hostile operations and is 
therefore not in breach of its due diligence obligation.58 Since no interna-
tionally wrongful act can be attributed to the territorial State, there is no legal 
basis for taking action into that State’s territory to end hostile cyber opera-
tions. However, if the hostile cyber operations present a grave threat to an 
essential interest of the State, and all other legal conditions attaching to the 
plea of necessity are satisfied, the responding State would not necessarily be 
held responsible for violating any international law obligation owed the ter-
ritorial State (like respect for its sovereignty) when acting against the non-
State actor. The precise measures a responding State may lawfully take with-
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out the territorial State’s consent depend, of course, on the specific custom-
ary and treaty obligations it owes to the territorial State and the nature of the 
response.  
Alternatively, attribution of a hostile cyber operation to a State may be 
clear, but the hostile operation might not violate a primary rule of interna-
tional law or at least be of uncertain legal character. Recall that the United 
Kingdom is of the view that no rule of sovereignty applies in the cyber con-
text. Although all other States that have opined directly on the matter take 
the opposite position, the rule remains ambiguous for them because—except 
for cases involving damage, injury, or permanent loss of functionality of af-
fected infrastructure—the threshold at which a remotely conducted cyber 
operation breaches the sovereignty of the State into which it is conducted is 
unsettled. In cases where the applicability of the rule to a particular situation 
is in doubt, an inability to reliably label an operation as internationally wrong-
ful would preclude a State (or at least cause hesitation) from taking a coun-
termeasure but would not bar a response based on necessity. 
To illustrate, consider hostile cyber operations against a power grid. As-
sume that ample evidence of attribution to another State exists, but whether 
the operation qualifies as an internationally wrongful act is unclear, as when 
the operation only temporarily interrupts power repeatedly for purely mali-
cious purposes without causing physical damage or injury. While some 
States, like France, would likely characterize the operation as a violation of 
sovereignty,59 others might not. Nor would the operations necessarily breach 
another international law rule, such as intervention.60 States that do not view 
the operation as violating sovereignty would consider countermeasures una-
vailable because there has been no internationally wrongful act, yet might be 
able to turn to the plea of necessity as the basis for a response, assuming its 
strict conditions are satisfied. 
The second threshold requirement is that the threat posed to the essen-
tial interest must be “grave and imminent.” Although international law offers 
no bright-line test for assessing gravity, the notion implicitly denotes both a 
threat’s degree of certainty and its severity vis-à-vis the essential interest. As 
to certainty, the threat must be objectively likely (or underway) and not 
merely apprehended as possible.61 Therefore, a responding State cannot rely 
 
59. Because the operation causes effects on French territory. FRANCE, INTERNA-
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on the plea unless it is able to conclude, based on reasonably available evi-
dence, that the threat is real.  
Severity, by contrast, indicates a threat that, if unaddressed, will interfere 
with the essential interest in a fundamental way and, consequently, the es-
sential interest will be severely and substantially harmed. In other words, the 
scale and effects of the expected harm must be significant and severe. The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 International Group of Experts took the view that the 
threat must interfere with an essential interest “in a fundamental way, like 
destroying the interest or rendering it largely dysfunctional.”62 Further, there 
is a synergistic relationship between gravity and essentiality. As elaborated 
by Germany, “[t]he more important an ‘essential interest’ is for the basic 
functioning of a State, the lower the threshold of the ‘gravity’ criterion 
should be.”63 
Unfortunately, cyber operations do not always lend themselves well to 
understanding and anticipating likely consequences. Recall, for instance, how 
Russia’s NotPetya operation spread far beyond its intended targets in 
Ukraine.64 But to the extent that that harm posed by a threatened or ongoing 
cyber operation is foreseeable and reasonably likely, it may be factored into 
the severity determination. This is so even when the harm caused is indirect, 
as with the knock-on consequences of an operation targeting a supply chain.  
Although countermeasures are not dependent on the gravity of the hos-
tile cyber operation to which they respond, the plea of necessity is likely less 
demanding than self-defense in terms of severity. First, self-defense requires 
that the hostile cyber operation be at the level of an “armed attack,” which 
by the prevailing view (Nicaragua) is the “most grave” form of the use of 
force. The point at which the resulting harm qualifies as an armed attack is 
unclear, but it clearly must be substantial. While the quantum of harm nec-
essary to allow for a response based on necessity is also ambiguous, there 
has been no suggestion that it need reach the level of an armed attack. On 
the contrary, France, for example, has confirmed that it “does not rule out 
the option of invoking a state of distress or necessity in order to protect a 
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vital interest against a cyberattack which is below the threshold of armed 
attack but constitutes a serious and imminent danger.”65  
Further, recall the question of whether self-defense is available when the 
harm being suffered is neither physically damaging nor injurious. In contrast, 
there is no suggestion that the harm caused to the target State’s essential 
interest be of any particular nature before a State may respond based on 
necessity.66 As an example, the plea of necessity sidesteps self-defense’s un-
certainty regarding whether a highly disruptive but non-destructive cyber op-
eration directed at the national financial sector would qualify as an armed 
attack. Indeed, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has offered the 
examples of “situations in which virtually the entire internet is rendered in-
accessible or where there are severe shocks to the financial markets” as mer-
iting resort to the plea of necessity.67  
The second requirement, that the peril be “imminent,” is temporal in 
character. It demonstrates that the plea of necessity can operate preemp-
tively. Therefore, the plea might sometimes be available when a counter-
measure would not since anticipatory countermeasures are impermissible.68  
Self-defense does envisage situations in which defensive measures are 
permissible in the face of an imminent armed attack. Although the notion of 
imminency has been the topic of considerable debate in the context of the 
law of self-defense,69 legal experts have paid scant attention to the notion as 
it applies to necessity. The question is how far in advance may a State take 
anticipatory measures to prevent a hostile cyber operation that will cause the 
requisite harm?  
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the International Court of Justice 
considered the plea’s temporal criterion. The Court observed, “ ‘[i]mmi-
nence’ is synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or ‘proximity’ and goes far beyond 
the concept of ‘possibility.’ ”70 It went on to clarify that the imminence cri-
terion does not exclude “a ‘peril’ appearing in the long term [from being] 
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‘imminent’ as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the 
realization of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less 
certain and inevitable.”71 By the Court’s approach, imminence in the context 
of necessity is not a purely temporal bar; rather, it also concerns the proba-
bility of a future event unfolding.   
Understood in this way, imminence is not measured solely by its prox-
imity to the harm the response is meant to preempt, as was traditionally the 
case with anticipatory self-defense. By that so-called “Caroline” standard, self-
defense is available only when the threat becomes “instant, and overwhelm-
ing leaving no moment for deliberation.”72 Thus, necessity imminency af-
fords States greater temporal flexibility in mounting an anticipatory opera-
tion to forestall a cyber operation against an essential interest than they 
would have in responding to an armed attack against that interest in self-
defense. For example, it follows that where a State acquires reliable intelli-
gence of a hostile cyber operation that will seriously harm an essential inter-
est, and there are reasonable grounds upon which to conclude that the op-
portunity to take measures to effectively prevent the harmful operation will 
not arise again, a State may be entitled to take steps based on necessity to 
prevent the harm from occurring, however distant in time.   
The plea of necessity’s greater flexibility may diminish over time in light 
of the “last window of opportunity” reasoning that has been articulated by 
some States in the context of self-defense.73 According to its proponents, a 
hostile cyber threat is imminent when the final opportunity to take action to 
prevent the attack is about to be lost.74 Thus, this self-defense interpretation 
is analogous in terms of timing to a situation satisfying imminency in the 
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necessity sense. Indeed, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 International Group of Ex-
perts were of the view that the last window of opportunity approach satisfies 
the plea of necessity’s imminence requirement, citing the example of a State 
in possession of reliable intelligence that a non-State group is going to launch 
a hostile cyber operation of the requisite severity against an essential interest 
and failure to act promptly “will risk losing the chance to effectively prevent 
the operation from occurring.”75 
Although the International Law Commission’s commentary to Article 
25 observes that “by definition, in cases of necessity the peril will not yet 
have occurred,” this should not be read as precluding the plea in situations 
where the threat has materialized, and the harm is occurring.76 It would be 
counterintuitive to suggest that the plea is unavailable to mitigate further 
harm, such as that resulting from hostile cyber operations interfering with 
the COVID-19 response.77 As the Tallinn Manual 2.0 International Group of 
Experts noted, “the preclusion of wrongfulness on the basis of necessity ap-
plies equally when the cyber operations in question are underway and the 




The plea of necessity is not without its limitations. After all, the State seeking 
to rely on it is consciously choosing to act in a manner that will entail the 
breach of an international obligation owed to another State. The limitations 
that attach to the plea are stringent and crafted to discourage law-breaking. 
In addition to the threshold requirements elaborated above, the unlawful 
measures taken by a State must be the “only way” to avert the threat, and 
may not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the 
obligation exists or of the “international community as a whole.”79    
The “only way” limitation means that a response based on the plea of 
necessity must be the sole means of preventing (or stopping) the harm 
caused by the hostile cyber operation. States cannot rely on the plea if the 
otherwise unlawful response is merely the preferred course of action among 
options that include ones that do not entail a breach of an existing obligation. 
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High cost, inconvenience, or other factors that do not factually preclude ex-
ecution of lawful alternatives are not grounds for characterizing a cyber op-
eration as an only means.80  
Implicit in the “only way” limitation is a requirement that if there are 
multiple means to address the grave peril posed to the essential interest, that 
which causes the least harm to other States is the only one allowed, so long 
as the likelihood of success is roughly equivalent. After all, the plea is limited 
to exceptional situations that justify engaging in otherwise unlawful actions 
to the detriment of other States that may have nothing to do with the threat 
to the essential interest. It would fly in the face of the rule’s object and pur-
pose to allow the responding State to cause greater harm to other States than 
needed in the circumstances. 
Finally, the “only way” limitation raises the issue of likelihood of success, 
both as to the operation itself and when considering it in light of other op-
tions. In other words, when is an operation to be regarded as a viable means 
of addressing a hostile cyber operation that threatens grave harm to an es-
sential interest? Although there is no agreed-upon threshold for the requisite 
likelihood of success, absolute certainty clearly is not required. After all, sit-
uations that justify resorting to the plea could be highly complicated, espe-
cially in the cyber context where technical complexity, compounded by at-
tribution challenges, looms large. To impose such a standard would denude 
the plea of necessity of its practical relevance.  
Yet, since acting based on necessity involves engaging in an otherwise 
unlawful act against a State that may have little connection to the underlying 
hostile cyber operation, it would run contrary to the balancing of State inter-
ests that the plea of necessity represents to require only some prospect of 
success. As a practical matter, the standard applicable in these situations, 
some of which could require immediate response to a rapidly unfolding 
cyber-driven crisis, is one where the victim State must act as a reasonable 
State would in the same or similar circumstances. 
The second limitation is that the responding State’s measure must “not 
seriously impair an essential interest” of other States. It is an acknowledg-
ment that although the plea of necessity permits otherwise internationally 
wrongful acts in order to minimize overall harm occurring in the interna-
tional community,81 there are lines that may not be crossed. The brightest of 
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these is that the act of addressing grave and imminent threats to essential 
interests should not come at the expense of the essential interests of other 
States, which might have no involvement in executing the hostile operations. 
To justify affecting such interests, the affected State instead must have en-
gaged in internationally wrongful conduct that opens the door to counter-
measures or, if the response involves the use of force, qualifies as an armed 
attack. 
It is important to understand what this limitation means in practice. 
When the necessity-based response does not seriously impair other States’ 
essential interests, it is clear that the victim State’s interests outweigh those 
of affected States because the plea of necessity is only available to the victim 
State when a grave and imminent threat to an essential interest threshold is 
posed. But the implicit balancing of interests ceases once the former’s essen-
tial interests are seriously impacted. Even if the threat to the victim State’s 
essential interest is far more significant than that posed to other States by the 
response, a response based on the plea of necessity will not be available if 
another State’s essential interests are at risk of being seriously impaired.  
Assuming agreement on what qualifies as an essential interest, whether a 
responding State can rely on necessity to preclude the response’s wrongful-
ness will turn on the interpretation of serious impairment. At a minimum, it 
follows that a responding State must undertake “a reasonable assessment of 
the competing interests, whether these are individual or collective.”82 That 
reasonable assessment should consider the fact that a response based on ne-
cessity involves self-exemption from primary rules of international law, a dy-
namic that threatens the rule of law more broadly. Doubt as to whether the 
serious impairment threshold is met accordingly should be resolved in favor 
of satisfying the standard.  
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts could not agree on whether necessity al-
lows a State to use force in response to qualifying cyber operations.83 Some 
of the experts were of the view that a use of force as a response option to a 
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hostile cyber operation, even one presenting a grave peril to an essential in-
terest, may only be justified based on the law of self-defense or authorization 
from the Security Council. In other words, resort to a use of force requires 
a specific exclusion to the prohibition on the use of force found in Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary law. For these experts, uses of force 
are particularly grave actions by States and, as the resort to force would nec-
essarily adversely harm an essential interest of another State by definition, 
plea of necessity responses cannot extend to the use of force  
The remaining experts were of the view that in certain limited circum-
stances, a use of force founded on the plea of necessity is permissible. They 
came to that conclusion by reasoning that the absence of this possibility 
might leave States without any recourse in the face of hostile cyber opera-
tions, either because the operation does not reach the level of an armed at-
tack or because conditions precedent to the taking of countermeasures, such 
as attribution to a State, are absent. Moreover, an action that is neither de-
structive nor injurious can qualify as a use of force, for instance, because it 
permanently interferes with the targeted system’s functionality. If the use of 
force is prohibited, resort to such effective operations in situations of neces-
sity would be unlawful.  
 
C. Assistance by Other States? 
 
The possibility of other States providing assistance in addressing a necessity 
situation bears on the “only” condition precedent. Take, for example, a State 
confronting the prospect of a grave hostile cyber operation directed at its 
emergency services by non-State actors located in another State. If the terri-
torial State is both willing and able to prevent the hostile operation, the vic-
tim State (even if its technological capacity is more advanced) may not rely 
on the plea to engage in unilateral action to thwart the operation, at least 
absent the territorial State’s consent. In this situation, the territorial State is 
complying with its due diligence obligation; therefore, there is no need for 
the victim State to act at all. 
Less settled is a situation in which another State has no due diligence 











from or through its territory84 or will be mounted from a third State’s terri-
tory.85 If that State nevertheless is willing and able to provide assistance or 
act to prevent the operation in a manner that itself is not internationally 
wrongful, must the State facing the grave and imminent peril to its essential 
interest accept the offer of assistance?  
A majority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts concurred with the position 
articulated in the International Law Commission’s commentary to Article 
25—that necessity is unavailable so long as there is any feasible lawful alter-
native, as in this case.86 For instance, the assisting State might have the ca-
pacity to decrypt malware that has been used to encrypt systems in the victim 
State. It should be cautioned that a minority believed that in evaluating 
whether the proposed operation is the only way to defeat the threatened or 
ongoing hostile cyber operation, the State considering necessity need only 
look to its own capabilities.  
Going one step further, may other States either assist the victim State in 
its otherwise unlawful response to the cyber operation that opened the door 
to the plea of necessity or conduct the response for that State? This is an 
even more challenging question and one that has arisen in the context of 
countermeasures.  
The answer may lie in the distinction between justification and excuse. 
In domestic criminal law, justifications act to negate wrongfulness, while ex-
cuses concern situations where the actor will not be blamed for the wrongful 
conduct, although the act is no less wrongful. The Articles on State Respon-
sibility’s characterization of necessity as a ground for precluding an act’s 
wrongfulness suggests that it is a justification. Yet, if the effect of a circum-
stance precluding wrongfulness is to suspend the responding State’s interna-
tional obligation temporarily, it would appear that necessity should be un-
derstood as an excuse. The International Law Commission’s commentary on 
Article 25 does not resolve this question, although at times it leans towards 
 
84. The due diligence obligation only attaches when the operation from or through the 
State’s territory is ongoing (or, perhaps, imminent in the sense of material steps having been 
taken). TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, at 43–44. 
85. The due diligence obligation only attaches when the hostile cyber operation is 
mounted from or through the State in question. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, at 
32–33. 
86. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, at 141, citing Articles on State Responsibility, 











treating necessity as an excuse.87 This ambiguity may simply reflect the recog-
nition that international law is the outcome of State practice, and at least for 
the time being, there is no clear practice upon which to reach a definitive 
conclusion.      
Since the distinction between justification and excuse is rooted in do-
mestic criminal law, it cannot be transposed directly to the inter-State level. 
Nevertheless, its logic bears on whether third parties are lawfully entitled to 
assist a responding State or act on its behalf. Since conduct that is justified 
precludes wrongfulness, third States should be able to lawfully assist a re-
sponding State because the measures taken are not considered unlawful in 
the circumstances. By contrast, since excuses attach only to the responding 
State, third States arguably would be responsible for engaging in any inter-
nationally wrongful action in support of the victim State, even though the 
latter’s actions would not incur international responsibility.   
This distinction’s repercussions are highly consequential in the cyber do-
main, where it is not uncommon for States responding to hostile cyber op-
erations to seek assistance from third States that are more technologically 
advanced, as occurred in the 2007 cyber operations against Estonia and those 
against Georgia the following year.88 Although necessity, pleaded as a justi-
fication, would enable third States to lawfully assist, justifications are poten-
tially disruptive for both international and domestic legal regimes because 
they have the quasi-legislative effect of legitimizing rule-breaking. By con-
trast, excuses do not modify the norm’s prescriptive quality because judg-
ment shifts from the act—which remains unlawful—to the actor.   
From the viewpoint of States that are technologically less equipped to 
respond to a serious cyber operation, the preferred characterization would 
likely be that necessity is a justification. Third State assistance would be per-
missible, although only when conducted at the victim State’s request and in 
strict conformity with any limitations set by that State with respect to the 
assistance. Treated as an excuse, necessity would potentially leave many 
States without any response option in the face of serious hostile cyber oper-
ations falling below the armed attack (self-defense) level and failing to satisfy 
a condition precedent to taking countermeasures, such as attributability to a 
State. Both views have potential downsides. Allowing for collective action 
risks escalation by bringing technologically advanced States directly into the 
“dispute.” But if acting collectively in the face of necessity is prohibited, an 
 
87. Article 25 will “only rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obliga-
tion.” Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 25 cmt. ¶ 2. 











incentive will exist to treat hostile operations as armed attacks, which would 
itself be destabilizing, so as to open the door to assistance from other States.  
Of course, allowing assistance in conducting otherwise unlawful cyber 
operations on the basis of necessity would correspond with the treatment 
accorded self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness by the In-
ternational Law Commission in Article 21 of its Articles on State Responsi-
bility.89 And though the permissibility of collective cyber countermeasures 
remains an open question, with States on both sides of the issue staying non-
committal, there is a sound basis for treating them as permitted.90 Styling 
necessity as allowing for collective action therefore would enjoy doctrinal 
credibility based on status as a justification and be congruent with the exist-




Finally, the plea of necessity offers certain benefits with respect to the geog-
raphy of a victim State’s response. States sometimes operate from or through 
other States for various reasons. These can include masking origin, as oc-
curred in the 2016 U.S. election meddling,91 taking advantage of another 
State’s more advanced cyberinfrastructure, or injecting uncertainty into at-
tribution, as is sometimes an objective with North Korean operations from 
China.92 Non-State actors like terrorists or hacker groups might operate from 
territory that is ill-governed or sympathetic to their cause and therefore un-
likely to suppress such operations. Moreover, cyber operations can be con-
ducted remotely using infrastructure on a third State’s territory. In these and 
similar cases, the victim State may need to conduct its responsive operations 
into the State from or through which the operations are mounted when the 
 
89. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 21 (“The wrongfulness of an act 
of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in con-
formity with the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
90. This is the conclusion reached by Watts and Schmitt, supra note 44. 
91. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032, ¶¶ 29–
31, 39–40, 2018 WL 914777, (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/ 
1035477/download. 
92. Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In & Kim Kyoung Gon, The All-Purpose Sword: North 
Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategies, in 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER 












latter is not legally responsible for the hostile operations, or attribution can-
not be established. There are obstacles to doing so in both the law governing 
countermeasures and the law of self-defense. 
Recall that countermeasures must be directed at a State that has commit-
ted an internationally wrongful act or one to which a non-State cyber oper-
ation can be attributed. In cases where it is unclear whether the State from 
or through which the hostile cyber operation was conducted is responsible 
for that operation, the victim State may respond with a countermeasure into 
that State’s territory if the latter is in breach of its due diligence obligation. It 
will not be in breach if it lacks the means to put an end to the hostile opera-
tions from its territory,93 and it is under no obligation to accept offers of 
assistance in that regard from the victim or other States.94 Absent breach of 
the due diligence obligation, the countermeasure option is off the table. 
With respect to self-defense, whether defensive cyber operations may be 
conducted into a State from or through which hostile operations are being 
conducted remains a controversial question. Advocates of the unwilling or 
unable approach would argue that limited operations to defeat the imminent 
or ongoing cyber or kinetic armed attack by the non-State actors are lawful. 
Still, that view is by no means universal.95  
The plea of necessity avoids these obstacles altogether in that it contem-
plates action by a State that would necessarily constitute an internationally 
wrongful act against another State. It is precisely because necessity allows for 
States to engage in an internationally wrongful act that the conditions set by 
law are narrowly defined and the action must seriously impair another State’s 
essential interests. Geography, as such, poses no legal impediment to acting 
based on necessity. 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
One fundamental purpose of international law is to maintain international 
peace and security among members of the global community. It is a body of 
law that seeks to prevent conflict by setting forth a normative architecture 
designed to resolve interstate disputes. To the extent that international law 
 
93. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 21, at 47. 
94. Id. at 50. 
95. France, for instance, has rejected the approach in the cyber context. FRANCE, IN-











is concerned primarily with governing the relations between States, the envi-
ronment within which States interact with one another should have little 
bearing on the applicability of the law.96   
Yet, with the advent of cyber capabilities and activities, States have felt 
compelled, in the interest of promoting peace and security, to revisit the 
founding principles and core rules of international law to clarify precisely 
how international law applies in this domain. Many of the resulting questions 
remain unanswered or disputed, thereby hobbling the ready application of 
traditional response options like countermeasures and self-defense. And in 
some cases, those responses simply do not map neatly onto the digital world.   
Of course, the plea of necessity is available only when an essential inter-
est of the State is under grave threat and the proposed response is the sole 
means of addressing that threat. Nevertheless, when those rare circum-
stances arise, the plea opens the door to responses that might otherwise be 
unavailable. Key among these are cases in which it is unclear that the opera-
tion to which a response is needed is itself an internationally wrongful act, as 
in whether a cyber operation is a violation of sovereignty, or when qualifying 
hostile cyber operations are either of uncertain origin or conducted by non-
State actors operating independently.  
Because necessity can offer States a sound legal basis for acting in the 
cyber realm when other response options are either unavailable or likely to 
increase the risk to peace and security, comprehensive cyber strategy and 
operational planning should include careful consideration of how necessity 
fits into the overall scheme for addressing hostile cyber operations. States 
have too long overlooked this valuable gap-filling response option. 
 
96. It thus falls on those who would question its applicability to the cyber world to 
explain why this should be so. 
